ON GLOBALIZATION (AND HUMAN RIGHTS): A PROPOS 9/11^*
Imer B. FLORES^**

Original Text (Spanish) PDF

SUMMARY
I. Introduction. II. What is globalization?. III. Globalization and internationalization. IV. Globalization versus globalizations. V. Economic globalization vis à vis political globalization. VI. Globalization: convergence and/or divergence. VII. Globaphiles and globaphobes. VIII. Globalization and conflict. IX. Globalization + conflict = 9/11. X. Conclusion.

I. INTRODUCTION

To globalize or not to globalize, that seems to be the question and the big issue of our times. At a time, incapable of replacing the bipolar equilibrium of the ideological and political postwar dichotomy with a tripolar "balance of power" peculiar off the regional economical trichotomy of the late 20th century, in which an "hegemon", i.e. a single economical, ideological, political and military world power, emerges departing from the ideal that inspired Immanuel Kant to write Zum Ewigen Frieden¹ by getting much closer to a world of widespread instability, uncertainty, and insecurity at the turn of the 21st century and the third millennium, as shown by the terrorist attacks to the Twin Towers, in New York City, and the Pentagon, in Washington D.C., on September 11, 2001. Thus, globalization -which more or less coincides with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union and Bloc- does not imply the end of history or the ending of conflict and polarity, but is rather the beginning of the "Hot Peace".²

However, it is not clear what the meaning of globalization is; nor whether its scope and limits are merely international or truly global; nor whether we are dealing with one or many globalizations; nor if some of them -economical and political, for instance- can collaborate and/or conflict with each other; nor whether this implies convergence and/or divergence; nor whether it indicates love or hate; nor whether its distinguishing and unique trait is conflict; nor even whether the best or, in this case, the worst example of the era of globalization is precisely the attacks of 9/11. Such are the issues and questions we will deal in this article on globalization and, to a lesser extent, on its impact on human rights.

II. WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION?

Globalization is the sign of our times and it seems to have come to stay for a while. However, the scope and limits of globalization are not clear or precise at all. In fact, the word 'globalization' is: 1) ambiguous, as it refers, or can refer, to both an activity-process and a product-result; 2) vague, because there is no pre-established criteria as to which its distinguishing features are, or the quality or quantity these features must have to attribute them to something; and 3) emotional, since the mere mention of this word gives rise to the most conflicting feelings or opinions. In the remaining of this section, we will emphasize the ambiguity and vagueness of the term 'globalization', and in a subsequent section, we will emphasize its emotional nature.

According to the dictionary, the word 'globalization' connotes the action and effect of globalizing, while the verb globalizing, i.e. "to globalize", denotes the idea of posing or presenting something "globally" -that is to say, in an overall, comprehensive, or full fashion- or, in other words, as a complete and comprehensive whole that can be considered a unit. In this regard, the term 'globalization' -as the action and effect of globalizing- can mean at least two things: 1) an activity or process that implies global actions; and 2) a product or result having global effects. Consequently, according to its common use, we understand 'globalization' as both the activity-process that takes -or intends to take- place all over the world, and the product-result that has -or pretends to have- an effect on it as a whole.

In this sense, globalization as activity-process and product-result with global actions and effects is nothing more than a conceptual structure -a "mere idea" of reason to Immanuel Kant; "fiction" to Hans Vaihinger; or an "hermeneutic reality" to Enrique Cáceres-³ that enables us to understand and explain that there can be something with actions and effects, in the entire globe or globalization but it may also refer to the cosmos, the planet, the universe or even the world, and we could call it "cosmovision", "planetarization", "universalization", or "worldization", respectively. As such, it is a more ambitious, complex and sophisticated version of what we know as 'internationalization' or 'regionalization', which by definition implies partial actions and effects: international, among nations, or regional, within a single region.

III. GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONALIZATION

Even though our purpose is not to begin with, or even less, end the discussion on whether we are in the era of globalization, strictly speaking, or at least one of internationalization, we would like to make a few comments. First, it is true that we now live in an era of growing internationalization, in which actions and effects are partial -international- but not yet truly total -global-. However, it is also clear that nowadays it is not enough to make a clarification that includes the first and leaves out the second, especially because the characteristic feature is the claim that there is -or there should be- activities-processes and products-results, the impacts of which can be felt in the whole and not only in some of its parts. Second, actions and effects should not and must not appear, as we will later see, only within the international sphere, literally among nations, but should implicate a wide variety of actors and a plurality of spheres that go far beyond the limits and boundaries of a Nation-State, or for short of a State.

Therefore, we believe that in order to portray our era it is better to talk about globalization, because it not only implies that the actions and effects are -or should be- global, but also that the actors and spheres are -or should be- global as well. For the time being, it is enough to say that the State is no longer the only actor, and that there is great diversity of public or private agents.

IV. GLOBALIZATION VERSUS GLOBALIZATIONS

It is fitting to state that even though we are talking about globalization as though we could refer to it as a single one, this is not precise, because as we will see below, there are not only one, but many globalizations. Firstly, since it is certainly affected by the activity-process/product-result ambiguity, there can be at least two different globalizations: one linked together with globalizing actions, and another linked together with globalized effects. Likewise, due to its vagueness, there can be as many globalizations as criterion to qualify or quantify its actions and effects.

Secondly, it is evident that since the actions and effects of globalization are not felt equally throughout the globe, it is not possible to talk about a more or less homogeneous activity or product, but rather several processes and results that are heterogeneous among them: no globalizing activity-process or globalized product-result is the same as the rest. Therefore, there are many different globalizations.

Thirdly, since there are no global actions or effects that are homologous to each other, the actors and spheres are not the same everywhere, to the extent that there are very different globalizations with manifestations that admit various degrees. Therefore, we can talk about globalization in many fields, from the scientific-technological to the ideological, economical and political, to mention a few.

So, at first, scientific-technological globalization is the result of the revolution in the science and technology, which has drawn attention due to the great advances in industry, in general, and in electronics and computer science, in particular. As a result, there have been very great and amazing advances, not only in the means of communication and information, but also in transportation. Today it is possible to be informed of everything -or almost everything- that happens in the world, just as it is happening. We can also travel to any part of the world, or go around the world, in only a day, when before -according to Julio Verne- we required at least eighty days. This has favored higher interrelation and interdependence among all peoples, to the extent that they almost seemed to be a single one -Marshall McLuhan's "global village"-.⁴

However, this globalization has not been the only one and there have been strong repercussions in other spheres. As of the great development of the means of communication and information, there has been also an ideological globalization, i.e. of knowledge and ideas. In fact, from the media revolution and the creation of a worldwide communication and information network, we can transfer knowledge and ideas from one part of the globe to another immediately. This has had certainly an impact on the human being, who cannot enter into the Computer-Age with Stone-Age tools and mentality. Thus, Francis Bacon's dictum "Knowledge itself is power" has become the sign of our times.⁵ Along this line of thoughts, there are at least two different globalizations that are closely linked to the globalizations related to science and technology, and knowledge and ideas: the first, which almost everybody thinks of when speaking of globalization, is economic globalization -that of capital and market- and the second, closely related to the previous one, but not as evident, is political globalization -that of democracy and human rights-.

V. ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION VIS-A-VIS POLITICAL GLOBALIZATION

The remarkable transformation of science and technology, as well as that of the means of communication and information, and also the great and immediate transfer of knowledge and ideas through the media has fomented the quick spread of globalization into other spheres. It is well known that we can carry out financial transactions in real time, from one place of the globe to another, without any major problems.

Economic globalization can be put on the same level with the progressive integration of national economies into the global economy, whether by incorporating them into one or many different economic regions or into an international level outright. Nevertheless, economical integration is not costless, since it has its price, but its advantages should be, in principle, higher than its disadvantages in order to be justified.

The most direct consequence of this incorporation is that domestic economies lose their ability to unilaterally determine their agenda. The reason is evident: the State has stopped being the main agent -and even the only one acting- in these times. Therefore, the concept of sovereignty as an agglutinating principle is, if not at bay, as Raymond Vernon⁶ said, at least, about to be redefined or, worst, to undergo a restrictive review, as Marcos Kaplan⁷ would say.

Along with the State -and the international or regional organizations in which it takes part- there are a vast number of both public and private non-state actors, such as multinational companies, transnational corporations and public financial institutions, like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, both created in Bretton Woods in 1944, as well as the World Trade Organization, the successor of the GATT since 1985, and even non-governmental organizations, financial megaspeculators, like George Soros, and rating agencies, such as Standard & Poors and Moody. And we should not forget organized crime, the mafia, and drug trafficking, as well as guerrillas and terrorism, which operate on the fringes of the legal framework.⁸

It should be mentioned that the hegemonic model of economic globalization -capital and (free) trade- is commonly known, according to John Williamson's accurate expression, as the "Washington Consensus", since it includes the position of the United States Government, the stance of public financial organizations, and the presence of influential and interest groups, all of them located in Washington D.C. Thus, the Consensus is very homogeneous by comprising four main formulas labeled as the "neoliberal program": 1) deregulation or economical liberalization; 2) opening the economy to the private sector, i.e. privatization; 3) openness of the economy to trade flows -goods and services- and investment -capital-; and, 4) tax and budgetary constraints and discipline.

Undoubtedly, some countries are more sensitive than others to the actions and effects of economic globalization. In fact, some rich or first-world countries, but mainly the G-7 countries -Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and the United States of America- are more active and participative when pronouncing, establishing and imposing the agenda, since they are in the center. The great majority of countries, poor or third-world, are passive and are not taken into account because they are in the periphery. These countries -the outlying countries- have nothing left but orthodoxy, and to follow to the letter what the center has decided. Some others might choose heterodoxy, and offer certain resistance to the globalizing destiny, because they can place themselves within the semi-periphery. Thus, the success or failure of the integration of a country into globalization essentially depends to a large extent on its starting point and final destination, whether it is at the vanguard or rearguard, but also on that on its way to globalization the country manages to maximize the advantages and minimize the disadvantages of the global actions and effects, by placing itself next to the winners instead of the losers.⁹

It is important to point out that globalization has both good and bad aspects, in such a way that, while it is possible to carry out transactions within real time, it can at the same time create great volatility, which traps countries between speculative capital and global financial speculation. In addition to this, these countries are not only hostages of higher vulnerability in the face of global economy, as well as their crises, which are also global and more frequent and deeper every time, but they are also hostages of government impotence and the indifference of public financial organizations.¹⁰

As regards political globalization, we should remember that the State -and its core concept 'sovereignty'- no longer holds the leading role. And while it has not stepped off the stage to place itself next to the audience, it has been relegated to a secondary or superfluous role, leaving the actors of economic globalization -capital and trade- the main role in the marquise of Shakespearean theater: Globe.

Even though the Nation-State has been left with no other option than to play a supporting role, Anthony Giddens states that, "global society is still a society of nation-states".¹¹ Thus, political globalization is identified -unlike economic globalization, which seems to be trying to make the State disappear and dismantle it by replacing it with capital and trade- with aspects regarding its organization and principles: 1) democracy, as its form of government, and 2) human rights, as its sorcerer's stone or quintessence. These two elements provide the criterion to measure credibility, if not the legitimacy, of the government, not only before its people, but also before the globe, in general, but also before public financial institutions, speculators and investors, in particular.

On the one hand, the above clarifies, to a large extent, that precisely when some authors, Samuel P. Huntington included, alluded to the "crisis of democracy", it reappears, for the purpose of bipolarity, and like a phoenix rising from its ashes, it comes as the only way of organization that is feasible to government and society. This has been classified as the "third wave of democratization" by the Harvard professor.¹² On the other hand, this sheds light on the fact that the growing importance human rights have achieved -from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations, of December 10, 1948, up to date, but especially in recent years- is not a coincidence. Thus, democracy and human rights are not only prerequisites, but requirements to obtain international loans and the good regard of speculation-investment. Obviously, this "conditionality" reduces or undermines national sovereignty, and so the political globalization is subordinated to economic globalization.

To conclude this section, I would like to add a couple of remarks. First, one can barely believe that globalization can be so prolific and fertile in almost any scope, including the economical and political ones, but so far any effort to do something against in the ethical an social spheres is futile and pointless. Therefore, it is urgent to deal with and answer the questions that arise from the pending agenda of globalization, within both the ethical and social spheres.¹³ Second, it is interesting that the economical and political globalizations are nothing more than new versions -or at least rejuvenated ones- of two old globalizations: capitalist and mercantilist, on one side, and colonialist and imperialist, on the other. Therefore, as a result we can reclassify globalization as (neo)capitalism or (neo)mercantilism, and even as (neo)colonialism or (neo)imperialism.

VI. GLOBALIZATION: CONVERGENCE AND/OR DIVERGENCE

With the end of bipolarity, Francis Fukuyama claimed that the triumph of both capitalism over socialism and liberalism over authoritarianism or totalitarianism would lead to an ideological uniformity and "the end of history". This position suggests the only thing the nations can do is to walk toward the same institutional unity, whether institutions of capital and (free) trade, on one side, or democracy and human rights, on the other. This stance is known as "convergence thesis".¹⁴

However, Huntington asserted that Fukuyama's theory was riddled with mistakes, because even though the States are getting closer to each other day by day, it is also true that there is ideological diversity, and somehow history is just beginning, as a "clash of civilizations". This stance -which supposes that countries can head towards a plurality of, including, but not limited to, capital and (free) trade, and democratic and human rights- is known as "divergence thesis".¹⁵

We believe that, due to its complexity, globalization includes both theses of convergence and divergence since globalization implies a certain consensus among countries -convergence- but it also points out at a conflict in the way each of them incorporates itself in it, or at least as to what each one understands they are doing -divergence-. To illustrate this point, we offer two examples: a very colloquial one, and another that is not as trivial. Every four years, at any Soccer World Championship, the whole globe, brought together by a ball, converges, but at the same time diverges because each country wants to be the champion.¹⁶ On the other hand, even though all the states converge in signing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, not all of them understand the same thing, because they diverge on its scope and limitations. For instance, even though all the states agreed to the prohibition of imposing cruel and inhumane punishments, Muslims believe that death penalty as imposed in some places of the United States is cruel and inhuman, while Americans believe that mutilation, common in some Arab states, is, by definition, cruel and inhumane.

Hence, it is not strange to find that even though the era of globalization in almost all countries is heading toward the same place -institutions of capital and (free) trade, on one side, and democratic and human rights institutions, on the other- they are taking paths that move apart. It would seem that, as in old times, all roads led to Rome, there is now a consensus that all the roads lead to globalization. But it is not a single homogeneous and uniform globalization, but countless globalizations that come and can create a conflict. We should say that there are no identical democracies throughout the globe and democratic institutions are not the same everywhere.¹⁷

In this regard, while we support heterogeneity and diversity, we cannot deny that globalization involves a certain homogeneity and uniformity. In fact, globalization is characterized by unity in plurality: pluribus unum.¹⁸ So, we should not be surprised by the fact that one is able to travel to any place in the globe and arrive at the same kind of airports and stay in the same hotel chain or go shopping at a mall that has more or less the same stores, and find food courts with Arab, Chinese, Indian, Mongolian restaurants or stands, or even naturist and vegetarian food, as well as steaks, hamburgers, fish and seafood, pizzas, sushi or tacos, and even find the same films at their movie theaters.

VII. GLOBAPHILES AND GLOBAPHOBES

We have already said that besides the problems of ambiguity and vagueness that the word "globalization" has, it also entails the emotional problem, since just the mention of the word triggers very conflicting feelings and opinions. Some people believe that globalization must be praised, as a panacea, and other people scorn it, as Pandora's Box. Thus, supporters, the so-called "globaphiles", for their love of globalization, attribute to it only positive or beneficial effects; while, its opponents, self-styled "globaphobes", for their hate of globalization, attribute to it only negative or detrimental effects.

Obviously, nothing can be all good or all bad in globalization, but our concern here is, first of all, to point out that there is a certain emotional level that makes us place ourselves either on the optimistic or the pessimistic side or on the idealistic or realistic side when speaking of globalization. Then, it should be also said that there is real opposition between, at least, two movements whose actions and effects are global: a) pro globalization (globaphiles), and 2) against globalization (globaphobes).

The paradox here is that the anti-globalization movement that of the globaphobes is one of the most globalized events, and its scope is also the most globalized in the contemporary globe. Here, we should clarify that globaphobes are not necessarily against all types of globalization. However, they can be the antagonists of one of its signs, i.e. the hegemonic model of the economic globalization known as the Washington Consensus, to which they attribute the "globalization of poverty", or what is the same, "the rich grow richer, while the poor grow poorer".

Amartya Sen, the 2000 Nobel prizewinner of Economics, holds that globalization is often considered a "global westernization", and either considered a blessing, "a gift from the West to the world", or a curse, "Western dominance".¹⁹ Nevertheless, Sen also states that globalization is neither new nor necessarily Western and rejecting it for representing its influence would be "a serious and costly error, in the same way that any European resistance to Eastern influence would have been at the beginning of the last millennium".²⁰ Furthermore, he asserts that "Over thousands of years, globalization has contributed to the progress of the world through travel, trade, migration, the spread of cultural influences, and the dissemination of knowledge and understanding (including that of science and technology)".²¹ So, he concludes:²²

…the confounding of globalization with Westernization is not only ahistorical, it also distracts attention from the many potential benefits of global integration. Globalization is a historical process that has offered an abundance of opportunities and rewards in the past and continues to do so today. The very existence of potentially large benefits makes the question of fairness in sharing the benefits of globalization so critically important.

The central issue of contention is not globalization itself, nor is it the use of the market as an institution, but the inequity in the overall balance of institutional arrangements -which produces very unequal sharing of the benefits of globalization-.

On the other hand, George Soros himself shows that the problem is that the development of a global economy has not been consistent with that of a global polity, which has been insufficient. Therefore, a global society -not to mention a global State- has not been created at the same time as the market, to the extent that "The basic unit for political and social life remains the nation-state".²³ Thus, Soros holds that global capitalism is a distorted form of an open society based on what he calls "market fundamentalism", i.e. a type of capitalism that depends exclusively on the forces of the market, which cannot respond to social needs and is also based on the capital market, to which instability is inherent: money can come in and out of any country, from one day to another, literally, overnight.

His critique to the global capitalist system is divided into two parts: first, he talks about the defects of the "market", while he then goes on to talk about the defects of what he defines as the "non-market", since there is no better term. On the one hand, "market fundamentalism" mainly consists of the alleged success of the market discipline -and its logic- not only in economic terms, but also regarding political and social matters. He further says: "but, if markets are inherently unstable, imposing market discipline means imposing instability". On the other hand, the failures of politics are worst than those of the market economy. In fact, the first ones have become the most powerful argument in favor of the second, despite their flaws: "disappointment with politics has fueled market's fundamentalism and, in turn, the ascent of market's fundamentalism has contributed to politics' failure. One of the great defects of the global capitalist system is that it has allowed the market mechanism and the profit motive to penetrate into fields of activity where they do not properly belong".²⁴

Consequently, the first one cautions us that "Capitalism needs democracy as a counterweight because the capitalist system by itself shows no tendency toward equilibrium". Ergo, what we need is the correct balance between economics and politics. Soros later refines: "To stabilize and regulate a truly global economy, we need some global system of political decision making. In short, we need a global society to support our global economy". He finally adds: "A global society does not mean (necessarily) a global state".²⁵

VIII. GLOBALIZATION AND CONFLICT

Although globalization implies a certain degree of homogeneity, unity, and uniformity, its main features -not as a simple convergence, but rather as a complex divergence- are: heterogeneity, diversity and plurality. In this regard, its main consequence -derived from the growing "clash of civilizations"- is conflict. Even though this is not new, nowadays, conflicts have acquired a new dimension because of their frequency and depth, to the extent that they stand out as a distinctive feature of globalization.

It has already been said that when domestic economies incorporate into global economy, and upon opening investment and trade flows, they become more and more vulnerable to the global market and capital. So, poor countries become more dependent, day after day, on rich countries because of the opening of trade, both in terms of assets and services and, to a lesser extent, of people -workers- but mostly the opening of the capital which has much more mobility than the rest of the production factors. Likewise, while it is possible to carry out transactions in real time, due to the great volatility of capital and financial speculation, crises can appear at any time and place, also in real time at the mercy of investors' short-term decisions and interests. Also linked to this, with the opening of their economy, borders also opened to a certain level, and create thereby new focuses of attention and sources of tension that we can identify grosso modo as security issues, from those regarding individuals -emigrants and immigrants, stateless, displaced, expatriated people and refugees- and groups on the fringes of the law -organized crime, mafia, and drug trafficking, guerillas and terrorism-.

As a result, globalization can be also attributed -besides the old dilemmas of capitalism and democracy, i.e. freedom or equality, State intervention or property rights, justice or efficiency-²⁶ a new problem, which is nothing but an already old, however revamped, problem: freedom versus security. Thus, sometimes the only way to promote security is through limiting freedom, and other times some restriction to security is required to protect freedom.²⁷

Meanwhile, it is worth to mention that while Huntington believes that the criteria to identify a "clash of civilizations" is the conflict between different religions, nothing prevents us from broadening it to the conflict that may arise between different cultures or diverse regions. In fact, we believe that such clashes arise -or might arise- between two or more conceptions and lifestyles, which are -or might be- even within a single civilization, because conflicts are not necessarily interstates, that is between States, but they can even be intrastate, that is within a State. In this regard, globalization is not necessarily a conflict between two worlds: the developed and the underdeveloped, the West and the East, the poor and the rich, just to mention some of most well-known dichotomies. Hence, in the ranks of the globaphobes there are not only activists from the underdeveloped, the East or poor world, but also from the developed, the West and rich world, who have pronounced themselves against globalization and organize street demonstrations in Prague, Seattle, Washington, Geneva, Monterrey or Los Cabos.

It is evident that for many people from undeveloped countries, globalization has not fulfilled its promises of economic advantages, not to mention that such benefit have not been for everybody; however, what is new is that the wave of condemnation has extended to developed countries. This clearly shows, as Joseph E. Stiglitz holds, that the malaise caused by globalization has generalized -not to say that it has globalized- since "globalization has not succeeded in reducing poverty, neither has it succeeded in ensuring stability".²⁸

Due to its failures in the fight against poverty, as guarantees of global economical and political stability were not enough, critics also accuse the rich countries of being hypocrites. These countries have forced poor countries to eliminate both trade barriers and production subsidies, but they, in exchange, have refused to open their markets to certain developing-countries' assets and have maintained their subsidies to agriculture and other productive sectors. Based on this double discourse, rich countries impose (free) market economy, externally, on poor countries while the rich ones internally keep corporatism and protectionism.

For these reasons, it is urgent to reform the agenda of globalization, which has mainly focused on economy to include politics and incorporate social issues. On one side, we have to pay much more attention to sustainable development, decent work and the improvement of sanitary conditions, by turning to see the United Nations, in general, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in particular; as well as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organization (WHO). On the other, the IMF is a public institution, and as such it is backed by money from worldwide contributors, but its officials do not report directly to the citizens that finance it or those who are directly affected by its policies. Rather, they report to the ministries of finance --or to any other trade, economic or financial institution-- and the central banks of different countries throughout the world. In this sense, "the current system… is one of taxation without representation".²⁹

Since the formula "taxation without representation" is the definition of tyranny, Stiglitz seems to suggest that the problem lies not only in the fact that public financial institutions do not represent the people, but also in the lack of responsibility, and the "responsiveness" of these institutions towards the citizens of the world. So, Stiglitz concludes, "Globalization can be reshaped, and when it is, when it is properly, fairly run, with all countries having a voice in policies affecting them, there is a possibility that it will help create a new global economy in which growth is not only more sustainable and less volatile but the fruits of this growth are more equitably shared".³⁰

IX. GLOBALIZATION + CONFLICT = 9/11

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks were not mere coincidence, but rather complex and multiple causalities: the cause of effects, and the effect of causes. In the first place, there are a number of symbolisms, why exactly on that day and why exactly those targets? First, it is indisputable that the date explains (almost) everything: the eleventh day -11- of the ninth month -9-, but since in the United States of America the month is first mentioned -9- and then the day -11- the date is 9/11, and as everybody knows 911 is the emergency call number in that country. Second, it is also indisputable that the two places explain, to a great extent, the events: New York City and Washington, D.C. Both cities are very important in the world's most powerful country; one city is its de facto economic center, and the other is its de jure military-political core, and either one could be the hub of the world: one of economic power and the other of military-political power. In this sense, we should not be surprised that the targets were the Twin Towers that housed the World Trade Center (WTC), and the Pentagon, which are the headquarters of the United States Armed Forces, and since one of the planes never reached its target, we may assume that its target could have been the Capitol building or the White House to complete the picture and the puzzle.

I would like to add a few remarks here. With regard to the date, while it is true that due to the magnitude of the tragedy it is not a date to be commemorated, it is clear that as a historic date it takes in better than any other date the essence of globalization: not only as a conflict, but also as uncertainty, instability and insecurity, both within and without. It does not mean that globalization was born at that moment, but it does mean that as of that moment we know some of its implications better. With regard to the place, New York City is, indeed, one of the most cosmopolitan cities in the world and the Twin Towers, as headquarters of the WTC, were a global symbol. Today, in their place there only remains what we know as Ground Zero which is -or at least could be- considered the first city of globalization.

Secondly, as the proverb says, "Para que la cuña apriete debe ser del mismo palo",^‡ to fight globalization, or in better words, to fight the country that commands its actions and benefits the most from its effects, we must use its same tools.³¹ As we all know, the lethal weapons used were planes made in the United States that fly at a speed of more than 750 kph and a fuel capacity of nearly 25,000 liters, which literally turn them into very powerful bombs, able, as we saw, to bring down the Twin Towers or destroy one of the five sides of the Pentagon. Among the victims, since civilians were used and civil targets were aimed at, were citizens from more than sixty countries, among which were, in addition to a majority of American citizens, 250 Indians, 200 Pakistanis, 200 Brits, 55 Australians, 23 Japans, and a large number of Arabs, Africans, Asians, Europeans, Latin Americans and many fellow Mexican co-nationals. So, the global holy war or Jihad led by Osama Bin Laden as the head of the Al Qaeda had to use the methods and techniques that belong to globalization:

1. An non-State global actor, a terrorist group, able to have the most powerful country and the rest of the world held at bay;

2. A globalizing movement, with a corporate and transnational nature, the "headquarters" of which seem to be a holding made up of small companies that multiply like cells around the world, mainly in the Middle East and Western Asia;

3. A globalized organization, which has in its ranks the best militants of the Islam, a kind of modern crusaders, willing to give their lives for a cause, highly qualified and modernized with knowledge of cybernetics and computer science, and, as we know for a fact, trained to fly the planes of death;

4. A Nemesis or archenemy of globalization, one of the most powerful and best informed men in the world, who works as though he was the chairman and CEO of the shura or the board of Al Qaeda;

5. Anti-globalization propaganda that is deeply-rooted anti-United States because they believe the United States of America is directly responsible for the occupation of the Holy Land, which circulates everywhere and whose message has disseminated very rapidly throughout the world;

6. A deep conflict between globaphiles and globaphobes, between two conceptions of the world and views on how to live it that clash spectacularly against each other, in the same way as the towers collapsed; and

7. A global paradox, as well, the United States' mistake in promoting resistance groups in the Islamic world, many of which later became terrorists, such as the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, to defend their geo-economic and geopolitical interests during the Cold War, which can be summarized in the eloquent warning of popular wisdom: "Cría cuervos y te sacarán los ojos".^‡‡

Thirdly, the sequels of the attack were felt and made present from the moment everybody, around the world, witnessed the attack live at the exact moment the events were taking place. Every time the media repeated the scenes, either when the second plane turned to embed itself into the south tower or when people, seized with desperation, threw themselves off the building, only to mention two of the most shocking scenes; whenever we see an image of New York City, with or without the towers, but especially now that, instead of a globalized world with no borders, we return to a world full of limitations and restrictions.

Apparently, nowadays, guaranteeing a regime of freedoms -and human rights- ends up being an obstacle to safeguard security effectively. Thus, freedom of transit, which does not provide for identity cards or the request for citizens' documents because it goes against its principles, proves to be incompatible with the security levels required after the terrorist attack. Let it suffice to refer to the limitations -so as not to call them violations- to the constitutional rights to which Mexican citizens and citizens throughout the world are subject to in any airport; or the potential danger of restricting terrorists' fundamental rights, when they are prosecuted through summary proceedings; or, utterly taking the law into one's own hands, to the extent of bombing civilian targets for no reason at all in the hope of finding a needle a haystack. Certainly, in either case innocent people are made to pay for the guilty ones.

X. CONCLUSION

Undoubtedly, the world has changed as a result of the terrorist attacks, because life will just not be the same after the 9/11. However, we cannot say that "everything changed" either, since, as Fred Halliday asserts, "September 11, 2001 is one of the landmarks of modern world history". To such an extent that for us -unlike what José Luis Ugalde says- it is indeed a landmark in history.³²

We all remember exactly where we were or what we were doing at about 8:47 a.m. (US EST) when the American Airlines flight 11 crashed into the North Tower; or at 9:03 a.m. when the United Airlines flight 175 crashed into the South Tower; or at 9:50 a.m. when this tower collapsed; or at 10:28 a.m. when it fell down; and, parallel, at 9:39 when the American Airlines flight 77 fell down on one of the five sides of the Pentagon; or at 10:10 a.m. when the United Airlines flight 93 crashed in a field southeast of Pittsburg, Pennsylvania.

It would seem as though that day, while witnessing the attack, we all became aware, as Karl Marx says, of class consciousness, which -mutatis mutandis- implies being part of a global class and belong to this kind of society. That day, the whole world, the United States of America included and American citizens "who sometimes have a village view of the world",³³ stopped being the conceited villagers, as José Marti once said, who believe the entire world is their village, and we became, for good or for bad, as Kant held universal citizens or, to say the least, global ones. Globalization is not longer presented as a dilemma, and as of 9/11 it was clear that it has arrived to stay with all its implications: conflict, divergence, insecurity, instability, and uncertainty…

Notes
* Translated by Carmen Valderrama Ramos.
** Professor-Researcher at the Legal Research Institute.
1 See Kant, Immanuel, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch", in Political Writings, trans. H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970 (there is Spanish version: La paz perpetua. Ensayo filosófico, trans. Francisco Rivero Pastor, Madrid, Espasa-Calpe, 1919).
2 See Flores, Imer B., "Naciones Unidas y la paz perpetua", Global. Revista del Consejo Latinoamericano de Estudiosos del Derecho Internacional y Comparado, year 1, No. 1, 1997, p. 25, and "Reflexión sobre el binomio guerra-paz. Fundamento del derecho y relaciones internacionales", Indicador jurídico, Vol. I, No. 4, 1998, p. 68.
3 Cfr. Kant, Immanuel, Critique of the Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, New York, Macmillan, 2003 (there is Spanish version: Crítica de la razón pura, trans. José Rovira Armengol, II tomes, Buenos Aires, Losada, 1960); and Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996 (there is Spanish version: La metafísica de las costumbres, trans. Adela Cortina Orts and Jesús Conill Sancho, Barcelona, Altaya, 1993); Vaihinger, Hans, The Philosophy of 'As If'. A System of the Theoretical, Practical and Religious Fictions of Mankind, trans. C. K. Ogden, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD, 1968; and, Cáceres, Enrique, "Las "teorías jurídicas" como realidades hermenéuticas", Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado, New Series, Año XXXV, Núm. 103, January-April 2002, pp. 27-62.
4 See McLuhan, Marshall, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1964 (there is Spanish version: La comprensión de los medios como las extensiones del hombre, trans. Ramón Palazón, Mexico, Diana, 1969): "The globe is no more than a village" (Quote taken from: http://som1.csudh.edu/faculty/cis/lpress/articles/macl.htm). On the great evolution of the human being in the 20th century, see Sagan, Carl, "The Cosmic Calendar", The Dragons of Eden, New York, Random House, 1977 (there is Spanish version: "El calendario cósmico", Los dragones del Edén, trans. Rafael Andreu, Mexico, Grijalbo, 1984, pp. 23-30).
5 Bacon, Francis, "Of Heresies", Religious Meditations: "Knowledge itself is power" ("Nam et ipsa scientia potestas est"). Compare futurologist Alvin Toffler's trilogy, Future Shock, New York, Random House, 1970 (there is Spanish version: El shock del futuro, trans. J. Ferrer Aleu, Mexico, Grijalbo, 1970); The Third Wave, New York, William Morrow and Co., 1980 (there is Spanish version: La tercera ola, trans. Adolfo Martín, Mexico, Diana, 1981); and, Power Shift, New York, Random House, 1990 (there is Spanish version: El cambio del poder, trans. Rafael Aparicio, Mexico, Plaza & Janés, 1992).
6 See Vernon, Raymond, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises, New York, Basic Books, 1971 (there is Spanish version: Soberanía en peligro. La difusión multinacional de las empresas de Estados Unidos, trans. Eduardo L. Suárez, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1973).
7 Cfr. Kaplan, Marcos, "El sistema internacional: límites, paradojas y posibilidades", in Valdés Ugalde, José Luis and Valadés, Diego (eds.), Globalidad y conflicto. Estados Unidos y la crisis de septiembre, Mexico, Centro de Investigaciones sobre América del Norte and Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, UNAM, 2002, p. 167.
8 Ibidem, p. 168
9 See Attali, Jacques, Millennium: Winners and Losers in the Coming World Order, New York, Times Books, 1991 (there is Spanish version: Milenio, trans. Bassols, R. M., Barcelona, Seix Barral, 1991); and, Unger, Roberto Mangabeira, Democracy Realized. The Progressive Alternative, London and New York, Verso, 1998.
10 Global financial crises are not new at all. We just have to remember the Great Depression of 1929, but their frequency and depth have become more complex. Nowadays, crises are recurrent and intense, their actions can originate anywhere -or in several places at the same time- and their effects can be felt everywhere and at the same time. We should recall that during recent years, the crises that originated in Latin American countries -Mexico in 1995 and Argentina in 2001, Southeast Asia, in 1997, and the former Soviet Union, in 1998-. To the extent that the hangovers caused by the tequila, tango, sake and vodka effects are felt everywhere and at any time.
11 Giddens, Anthony, The Third Way. The Renewal of Social Democracy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998, p. 14
12 Cfr. Crozier, Michel, J. et al., The Crisis of Democracy, New York, New York University Press, 1975; and Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Oklahoma, Oklahoma University Press, 1991.
13 See Küng, Hans, A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics, New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998.
14 See Fukuyama, Francis, "The End of History", The National Interest, No. 16, 1989; and, The End of History and the Last Man, New York, Avon Books, 1992 (there is Spanish version: El fin de la historia y del último hombre, Mexico, Planeta, 1992).
15 Huntington, Samuel P., "The Errors of Endism", The National Interest, No. 17, 1989; and, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Touchstone, 1997 (there is Spanish version: El choque de civilizaciones, trans. José Pedro Posaos Abadia, Paidós, 2000).
16 Manuel Becerra and I reached this conclusion in an informal conversation we had about the 1998 France World Cup, a couple of soccer world cups ago.
17 See Diamond, Larry and Plattner, Marc F. (eds.), The Global Divergence of Democracies, Baltimore-London, The John Hopkins University Press, 2001.
18 Cfr. Touraine, Alain, Pourrons-nous vivre ensamble? Égaux et différents, Paris, Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1997 (there is Spanish version: ¿Podremos vivir juntos?, trans. Horacio Pons, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1997).
19 Sen, Amartya, "Como juzgar la globalización", Perfil. La Jornada, February 1, 2002, p. I. ("How to Judge Globalism", obtained from: http://www.prospect.org/print/V13/1/sen-a.html).
20 Ibidem, p. II.
21 Ibidem, p. I. Let us just think that thanks to old globalizations like the one that originated from Marco Polo's trips -one of the first, if not the first global one- products from China, such as gunpowder and the bow, paper and printing press, the millwheel and the propeller, among others, were brought to other parts of the world. The same happens with mathematics, for instance, the decimal system first appeared and was developed in India, and was then innovated in the Arab countries, and finally arrived to Europe.
22 Ibidem, p. IV.
23 Soros, George, La crisis del capitalismo global. La sociedad abierta en peligro, trans. Fabian Chueca, Mexico, Plaza & Janés, 1999, p. 21 (Quotes taken from the excerpts of the book The Crisis of Global Capitalism, in http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Global_Economy/Crisis_Capitalism_Soros.html).
24 Ibidem, pp. 30 and 25.
25 Ibidem, pp. 29 and 31.
26 Cfr. the debates between John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, Robert Nozick and Amartya Sen, respectively: Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971 (there is Spanish version: Teoría de la justicia, trans. María Dolores González, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1979); Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, Massachusetts-London, Harvard University Press, 1977 (there is Spanish version: Los derechos en serio, trans. Marta Guastavino, Barcelona, Ariel, 1984); Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York, Basic Books, 1974 (there is Spanish version: Anarquía, Estado y utopía, trans. Rolando Tamayo y Salmorán, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1988); and, Sen, Amartya, "Rawls versus Bentham: An Axiomatic Examination of the Pure Distribution Problem", Theory and Decision, No. 4, 1974.
27 Cfr. Curzio Gutiérrez, Leonardo, "El dilema de Hobbes: ¿libertad o seguridad?", in Valdés Ugalde and Valadés (eds.), Globalidad y conflicto. Estados Unidos y la crisis de septiembre, cit., note 7, pp. 127-133.
28 Stiglitz, Joseph E., Globalization and its discontents, New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 2002 (there is Spanish version: El malestar en la globalización, trans. Carlos Rodríguez Braun, Madrid, Taurus, 2002, p. 30).
29 Ibidem, p. 45.
30 Ibidem, p. 48.
‡ Translator's note: This proverb literally says: "If you want the wedge to tighten you must made it from the same material you want it to tighten". A similar saying in English would be "to fight fire with fire".
31 Chanda, Nayan and Talbott, Strobe, "Introduction", in Talbott, Strobe and Chanda, Nayan (eds.), The Age of Terror. America and the World after September 11, New York, Basic Books-Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2001, p. XII: "The terrorists attacked the nation that, more than any other, had both driven globalization and benefited from it. They did so largely for that reason -that is, among their targets was globalization itself-".
‡‡ Translator's note: This saying literally says, "if you breed crows, they will pick out your eyes". This implies that the people you have helped turn against you by using the same tools used to help them.
32 Halliday, Fred. Two Hours that Shook the World. September 11, 2001: Causes and Consequences, London, Saqi Books, 2002, p. 32, quoted by José Luis Valdés Ugalde, "Introducción", in Valdés Ugalde and Valadés (eds.), Globalidad y conflicto. Estados Unidos y la crisis de septiembre, cit., note 7, p. 21 (Quote obtained at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/sociology/staff/academic/procteri/procteri_index/
teach/ssw/topics/topic16/ssw03ln16a/).
33 Valdés Ugalde, José Luis, "Estados Unidos y el sistema internacional después del 11 de septiembre. Algunas reflexiones desde México", in Valdés Ugalde and Valadés (eds.), Globalidad y conflicto. Estados Unidos y la crisis de septiembre, cit., note 7, p. 61.