PROTECTION IN JUDICIAL BUSINESS. THE CASE OF MIGUEL VEGA*
Manuel GONZÁLEZ OROPEZA**
Original Text (Spanish) PDF
SUMMARY
I. Limits and tendencies of the Mexican Judicial Power in its origins. II. Discussion of protection in judicial business in 1869. III. Motives of the Federal Judicature to revert the legal prohibition of the protection in judicial business. IV. Protection Miguel Vega.
I. LIMITS AND TENDENCIES OF THE MEXICAN JUDICIAL POWER IN ITS ORIGINS
Since 1824, the sovereignty of states had been defined as the definitive nature in the acts or resolutions of the organs of government, which implied the rejection of any review —on the part of different levels of government— of the acts decided on the power of the federative entities.
The Judicial Power, though undefined and weak in the particular constitutions of the states, also submitted itself to the rule that its resolutions could not be revoked by federal courts. Several state constitutions prescribed since their first fundamental text that the "judicial business" would end within their jurisdiction, up until the last instance, as it was determined by article 216 of the Constitution of the State of the West (Sonora and Sinaloa) on November 2, 1825; they followed this regulation from article 166 of the Constitution of Tamaulipas of 1825, article 190 of the one corresponding to Xalisco of 1824 and numeral 148 of the Zacatecanan Constitution of 1825.
In the same way, the interpretation of laws was, in the beginning, object of exclusive competition of the Legislative Power. As viciousness of this exclusive power of the legislator, there is the attribution contemplated in the actual clause f of constitutional article 72, known as the principle of the formal authority of the law, by means of which, any interpretation will have to be carried out following the same procedure marked for the normative creation; that is to say, the legislative process. It was common during the 19th century, to prescribe in the highest normative level of the federative entities, prohibition on the part of the Judicial Power in order to interpret or to suspend the application of the laws; any "doubt of law" that it suggests should be made out of the formal knowledge to the Congress of the State, for the conduit of the governor, without the Superior Tribunal of the entity being able to suggest it directly to the Legislative Power. Such was the logic behind article 189 of the Constitution of Xalisco of 1824, 147 of the Constitution of Zacatecas of 1825; of article 210, third paragraph, of the Constitution of Tamaulipas of 1825, just as article 171 of the Constitution of Tabasco of 1826, 118 of the Constitution of Michoacán of 1825 and 123 of the Constitution of San Luis Potosí of 1826, among others.
In the second half of the 19th century, the procedure concerning the doubts of law continued in effect thanks to the state constitutions of Chiapas of 1858 (article 73, paragraph VIII), Guanajuato of 1861 (article 82, paragraph III), and Morelos of 1878 (article 108, paragraph IX), among others.
Therefore, the judges could not perform other functions beyond that of judging and of making sure that the judged was carried out; because of this their sentences in all the causes —civil or criminal— should contain the expression of the actions, according to how it results from the process, just as the text of the law on which it is founded and to which it would have to literally fix, as it was affirmed by articles 142 and 150 of the Constitution of Yucatan of 1825. Tamaulipas managed to sanction with the removal of the authority if this one was willing to interpret the law, just as being willing to fine the individuals that induced the interpretation of the laws by authorities distinct from the legislative one.1
It stands out in the context of these tendencies, the figure of the Superior Minister of Justice of the State of Veracruz, the only example in our country of the Judicial Power deposited in one sole person, in the style of the Executive Power, according to this disposition expressed in article 65 of the Constitution of Veracruz of 1825.
On the other hand, since the Constitution of Yucatan of 1841, the state constitutions began to worry about the judicial protection of the rights of man consecrated in the respective federal entities.
Since the Constitution of Tabasco of 1857, in its article 50, paragraph I, this protection was established in the following terms:
They are attributions of the assembled Tribunal: To protect in the enjoyment of its rights to which they ask for their protection, when they are harmed in them by the political authorities against the literal text of the Constitution and the laws, limiting itself in this case to repair the damage in the part where they would have violated.
Campeche, in its Constitution of 1861, also established the judgment of protection against the decisions of the Executive Power when they would infringe upon the Constitution and the laws of the entity (article 66, paragraph I); the same was prescribed in the first Constitution of Hidalgo of 1870 (article 82, paragraph I).
Nevertheless, this favorable constitutional frame for the development of a judgment of local protection, beginning with the federal regulation laws of 1861 and 1869, this judgment began to develop with exclusiveness by the federal tribunals, gradually but definitively disappearing the state judicial means, not only for the protection of human rights, but for the conservation of the constitutional state supremacy.
Beginning with the regulation of the judgment of protection of 1869, the debate had been opened concerning the origin of the judgment of protection against the sentences of the superior tribunals of justice. Starting with the debates of the law, the decision to prohibit the federal cassation, via the judgment of protection, against the definitive judicial decisions of the states, was an object of divided opinions, without a clear majority. Although article 8 of the above-mentioned law consecrated the prohibition in a definite way, more with the intention of achieving juridical safety and of avoiding endless judgments, as the deputy Ezequiel Montes demonstrated in the session on December 5, 1868.
However, even before the expedition of the law of protection, it was applauded by a sector of the expert opinion of judges and deputies, the review of sentences of the superior tribunals of the federative entities, and even, of the Federal District, as in case of Domingo Benítez, when the resolution concerned a violation of individual rights;2 since according to article 101 of the Constitution of 1857, it made the judgment of protection proceed against any act of authority that violated the rights of man, for what the deputies Alcalde and Herrera, especially the latter, affirmed since then that the judgment of protection is an "ordinary resource" and not a subsidiary, wishing to manifest for it that the violation of individual rights should have been known by means of a proper judgment, "natural and ordinary",3 because of this, different from the original judgment in the state.
An example of the division on the origin of the protection in judicial business is the fact that the own project of law, discussed since November 19, 1868, proposed in an affirmative way the review by the Supreme Court in full session of "terminated causes in the States";4 while the law was approved ultimately, in a negative sense, with an incisive article against it: "The resource of protection in judicial business is not admissible".
II. DISCUSSION OF PROTECTION IN JUDICIAL BUSINESS IN 1869
The inflexibility in the authentic interpretation of the laws was so intolerable and unrealizable that the consolidation of the judgment of protection allowed the judicial authority the utilization of a "juridical" interpretation, applicable to the concrete case without general declarations, managing to be recognized normatively up to the modification of article 14 of the project of Constitution that Venustiano Carranza presented in 1916 and that was approved in February of 1917.
The legislator of 1869 declared himself incompetent to interpret the Constitution of 1857 and to define the scope of its article 101 just as to resolve, in consequence, if the protection proceeded against acts of all the authorities, including judicial ones. For the distinguished jurist and deputy, Emilio Velasco, the Constitution could not be interpreted (authentically) but by the Constituent Power; because of this, the ordinary congresses could not annotate the sense of the constitutional rules, not even when they would be regulated. In his own words: "Meanwhile the constituent power does not approve an addition to the Constitution, explaining the mentioned article, it corresponds to the Judicial Power to interpret its meaning". And the same year, the federal Judicial Power would give the interpretation of constitutional article 101 (of the Constitution of 1857), even in opposition to the specific text of the Law of Protection, in the protection promoted by Miguel Vega.
In the discussion it was made clear that the judgment of protection and the judicial review was the best remedy to control the constitutionality of the same laws, be they of the Federation or of the states themselves; because of this, if the action of the federal justice concerning the local laws could not be considered openly opposite to the sovereignty of the states, it was less so concerning its sentences.
Filomeno Mata, former constituent and member of the V Legislature of the Congress of the Union explained the generosity of the judicial function:
The Law of a State, when it attacked the Constitution or general laws, was declared void by the Congress; and the law of this one, reclaimed as unconstitutional, was submitted to the judgment of the majority of the legislatures. In any case, it was a declaration of war of power to power, and this war came with all of its results, its most baneful consequences. The leaders were obligated to promulgate and to execute the laws of the Federal Congress, as if they were employees of this administration and the executive power of the federation was sending orders to the governors from superior to inferior. A few times the laws or acts of the states superimposed the federal authority, and other times the Power of the Union would make them succumb to that of the State: in one and in another extreme one of the authorities always remained disarmed and debased, the discord having been sanctioned and even the civil war having been inevitably decreed…
The doubts and controversies between the Federation and the States and between this one and those are resolved and qualify naturally because of the legal means that the individuals use when they litigate their rights. They do not invoke their exclusive authority nor does each one deliberate it as part and as mediator, nor do they challenge each other and fight; nor do they call upon their arms: they go before a court, and there, in a judgment with all of their forms, the contest is decided with the difference of which in the litigation of an individual with an other one, the sentence is direct, universal, positive, and it understands the whole circle of controversial rights, while in the contest against the sovereign one, the judgment is indirect, particular, negative, and does not make general declarations, it protects, and declares free the complaining individuals of the obligation to fulfill the law or the act of which they complain.5
Because of this, from the first opinion of the mentioned Law of Protection, produced by the United Commissions of Constitutional Points and of Justice on November 19, 1868, it made the judgment of protection justified against the final judgments of the justice of the states, in case these violated any individual guarantee contained in the federal Constitution, attending the original project of the law prepared by the Secretary of Justice, Ignacio Mariscal, defended on January 9, 1869 by the Secretary himself.
At first, the discussion focused on which federal court would know protection cassation, if the courts of district as the Deputies Pankhurst and Beas suggested, or the Supreme Court of Justice itself,6 according to how another sector of deputies suggested them with a base in the project of regulation law on the protection of 1852.
The ideas abounded not only in regards to the above mentioned topic, but also the perceptions multiplied, even a new project of law being elaborated with a specific content on the sentences that were declared in last instance by the tribunals of the states, the Federal District, and the federal territories, elaborated by the deputies Mata and Baz on January 12, 1869.
The assaults to the origin of the protection in this matter are synthesized by Deputies Ríos and Valles: a) a decrease of the sovereignty of the states destroying the administration of justice, b) it makes the judgments interminable and c) it centralizes the administration of justice. Before this opposition, one adopts the resolution to deny the origin of the judgment against the resolutions of the supreme courts of justice, convinced in addition that the federal Constitution entrusted the local judges the application of the control of federal constitutionality of the local laws, conforming to former article 126, currently 133.7
Therefore, on December 31, 1868, the respective opinion withdraws itself for the joined commissions the respective opinion to present it in the way it would not proceed the protection in judicial business, since as Ezequiel Montes explained, the aforementioned matter was not foreseen by the federal Constituent, for which the secondary legislator might not extend to the Judicial Power a competition not included in the Constitution.
Although the results of this bountiful discussion were like this, the debates offer us the interesting conception of the meaning of juridical interpretation. Deputy Lama, contradicting Montes’s arguments, alluded:
Those of us who opposed the article, did not base ourselves on the interpretation, on its very general text and on its very wide spirit, because it is for us the law...
To wish to interpret it for the discussion of the Constituent Congress and for the silence of that assembly, I repeat that is not logical, because the argument of silence is not valid and what it is not doubtful, does not need interpretation.8
To this position, Deputy Velasco once again insisted on his position that it is fitting for the Judicial Power to interpret the federal Constitution.
Finally this legislative polemic was concluded on January 18, 1869 with 85 votes against the protection in judicial business and 31 in favor.
III. MOTIVES OF THE FEDERAL JUDICATURE TO REVERT THE LEGAL PROHIBITION OF THE PROTECTION IN JUDICIAL BUSINESS
In the whole discussion of the Law of Protection of 1869 two fixed ideas permeated: a) the judicial precedents of the United States must be the example to follow to resolve regarding the origin of the protection in judicial business and b) the judicial authority could interpret the meaning of the respective constitutional precept (article 101 of the Constitution of 1857).
For 1869, these questions had been resolved by the Supreme Court of the United States across a fundamental decision: Martin vs. Hunter’s Lessee 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
The first American case where it is resolved by the judicial authority of the federation as an authority of cassation, it fully involves John Marshall.
David Hunter of Virginia obtained in 1789 on Lord Fairfax’s large estate an endowment of 788 acres, which corresponded to the portion of land known as "useless and without ownership".
The above-mentioned endowment was granted by the state authorities with a base in the confiscation laws that Virginia had sent in the epoch of the Revolution of Independence of the United States against the English subjects from 1779 but that had not applied itself out of respect for the Agreement of Peace with England, signed in 1785 by the United States, where it had been agreed that the English and their properties would not be disturbed in North American territory.
Denny Martin Fairfax, legatee of Lord Fairfax, attacked the validity of the endowment carried out to Hunter, but this one came in 1791 to the Courts of the State Virginia, in the county of Winchester, to bring value to his titles on this land. The Court of Winchester resolved in 1794 against the pretension Hunter who had to appeal to the maximum Court of the State, the Court of Appeals, located in the capital, Richmond. In Virginia, the right of foreigners to inherit was not recognized.
The Court of Appeals presided by Spencer Roane knew about the case in 1796. In the same year, John Jay signed a new Agreement with England ratifying the commitment of The United States with that country concerning not taking reprisals against the properties of the English citizens.
For James and John Marshall, as well as for his brother-in-law, the large Fairfax estate was a possession that they valued and bought in 1806 and Hunter’s portion had small dimensions, so much so that it was found in litigation when they began the negotiations of his its acquisition. The transaction in 1806 had been concluded by Philip Martin, inheritor of Denny M. Fairfax.
Against the sentence of Virginia’s Court of Appeals, decided in 1810 in favor of Hunter, Philip Martin resorted to federal justice, with a basis in article 25 of the Law of Judicial Organization of 1789 that established the resource of appeal known as "writ of error" in order to re-examine the resolutions of the state courts in case of conflict for the application of an international agreement or of the federal law, as was the Agreement of Peace.
Justice Roane thought that this appeal, based on the above-mentioned federal law, was opposite to the Federal Constitution and its appraisal was shared by James Monroe and Thomas Jefferson.9
In the Supreme Court, John Marshall was exempted from resolving the case and it is assigned to Joseph Story, the great commentator of the Constitution of the United States, to resolve it. His arguments were:
a) The Constitution of the United States was not elaborated addressed to the States but to the people of the United States.10
b) The federal justice is not only of original jurisdiction, but also of appeal, since there is no constitutional rule that prohibits it.
c) The state courts possess concurrent jurisdiction in order to judge in agreement to federal law; for this reason, the Supreme Court must reserve the right to review their decisions.
d) Article 25 of the law of judicial organization is harmonic in the Constitution, since this one does not impede the jurisdiction of appeal.
e) The resolution turns around according to the interpretation of a federal law.
Definitively, Story and the majority of the Supreme Court revoked the judgment of the Court of Appeals. This opinion already had as a precedent the vote of Judge Cabell of Virginia’s Court Appeals, who had recognized the power of the Supreme Court to "re-examine, by means of the resource of ‘mistake’, the decision of the State Court, in order to confirm or revoke this decision".11
IV. PROTECTION MIGUEL VEGA
The elections for governor and vice-governor on September 1867 in Sinaloa had been very competed and conflictive, as four candidates had appeared two attorneys and two generals. The legislature of the state declared on December 21, 1867 Domingo Rubí as new governor of the state, as Irineo Paz was up in arms, among others, against this decision.
It was not until Ramon Corona's federal intervention around 1869 that the Ruby government in Sinaloa propped itself. The racketeering in public paths12 and the revolts of Adolfo Palacio and Plácido Vega were the most serious problems of this year.13
Rubí complained about the poor administration of commanding justice in the state:
The vicious way of prosecution that the colonial system bequeathed us still makes people feel its pernicious effects among us: this accumulation of expensive and extensive procedures, with its share of inquisitorial viciousness as it occurs in the summaries of criminal causes, is demonstrating our lag in this branch of the public administration of utmost importance; in order to remedy it and to escape from this dust with which antiquity has left our codes covered, it is necessary to place oneself at the height of the progresses of the century: the establishment of jurors, publicizing in the judgments by means of hearings and briefness in the end for its conclusion, it is this that the current state demands of our society: remaining simple spectators, is wanting to detain the impetuous current of progress so much so that everything drags it in its rapid race...
As for the personnel of the administration, the Executive does not have observe anything, as he believes that all of the employees in this branch fulfill their respective duties...14
The Judicial Power of the state was composed of the Supreme Court of Justice and of courts of first instance in Mazatlán (civil and criminal), Culiacán, Cosalá, Concordia, Fuente, San Ignacio, Rosario and Mocorito.
The Supreme Court was integrated by three ministers and a district attorney who were popularly elected every four years, with the possibility of re-election.15
Miguel Vega was a judge of the first instance in Mazatlán to whom the professional exercise of law was suspended as a sanction imposed by the Supreme Tribunal of the State, for having failed in his judgments against text of expressed law, which would have deserved the suspension of employment and his corresponding salary, but not of his profession, which was protected by the federal Constitution.
After a precision on the nature of the resolution of the state Tribunal, the act possessed a nature more administrative than judicial in the opinion of Minister Manuel Auza.16
During the month of July of 1869 the judgment of protection promoted by Miguel Vega was eased, based on the fact that the sanctioned decision of the Superior Tribunal of Sinaloa violated the right to exercise his profession. The court of district had refused the protection "leaving his rights safe".
It corresponded to León Guzmán as General Attorney of the Republic to formulate a motion revoking the sentence of the court of district and consequently protecting Vega.
The Superior Tribunal of Justice of Sinaloa denied yielding a report to the Supreme Court based on article 8 of the Law of Protection, and even after declaring the sentence on July 20, 1869, the Tribunal of Sinaloa denied completing because the judgment declared by the local judge had given authority of the thing judged, not being able to revoke it without incurring responsibility. "The Tribunal in the hard alternative of respecting the law or a resolution of the Court, chooses without vacillating for the first one", the Supreme Court of Sinaloa affirmed demonstrating that article 8 of the Law of Protection was final in that it prohibited the protection in judicial business:
It is an incontrovertible principle that the interpretation of the law corresponds to the person who gives it. If then, the Congress of the Union that established the judgments of protection, and promised a law to regulate them, comes later in this promised law, saying that it does not correspond in the judicial matters. What motivated reasons could this Court have to controvert this law, as it undoubtedly would have done, if it would have cooperated to make the protection effective in judicial businesses?17
The text of the law, the sovereignty of the State and the lack of public arguments of the Supreme Court18 induced a favoring of the arguments of the Superior Tribunal of Sinaloa. The Constitution has established the Law of Protection as supreme law of the Union, for this the judges of the states should obey it, according to article 126 itself, now 133, of the federal Constitution.
Confronting this situation, the judge of the district went to the governor of the state and the Supreme Court of Justice to the Secretary of Justice so that, even in the case of public force, Miguel Vega would be allowed to exercise his profession.19
This precedent made current the worry that had become manifest in the Congress when the Law of Protection was discussed, that finally it would correspond to the federal judge to interpret the Constitution concerning if the protection proceeded against acts of all of the authorities, including the judicial. In spite of the moderation of the resolution of the Supreme Court, with arguments being more about legality than about constitutionality, the protection Vega survived to the rebellion of the Supreme Court of Sinaloa, for this, in the Law of Protection of 1882, the prohibition of protection was eliminated in judicial businesses as something decrepit and futile.20
These judicial resolutions provoked —as much in the United States as in Mexico— reactions against the ministers of the Supreme Court. The Richmond Enquirer of Virginia, one of the most influential newspapers in the Southern part of the United States, commenced a campaign against the "usurpation" of the Federal Judicial Power, while the Federal Congress itself, as it discussed the budget, refused to increment the already increased salary of the Ministers of the Supreme Court of Justice.
In Mexico, the protection Vega voted by Ministers Vicente Riva Palacio, Ignacio Rarmírez, Joaquín Cardoso, Manuel Aura, Pedro Ordaz, José Ma. del Castillo Velasco, Simón Guzmán and the lawyer León Guzmán, and having been rejected by Ministers Pedro Ogazón, President of the Supreme Court, Luis Velázquez, José García Ramírez and M. Zavala, established the bases of the cassation protection, with the principle that the interpretation of the Constitution and the laws corresponded to the Judicial Power, attenuating the rigid rule of the legislative interpretation.
However, the Mexican magistrates themselves suffered the reprisal of the political judgment that the Congress of the Union attempted to carry out against it in order to resolve a protection against the text of article 8 of the Law of Protection. In a secret session on May 3, 1869, when the Supreme Court had not yet dictated definite resolution, that was July 20, Deputies Gaxiola, Macin, Sánchez Azcona and Julio Zárate, presented formal accusation against Riva Palacio, Castillo Velasco, Ordaz, Cardoso y Ramírez and the Guzmans for having admitted the claim of protection:
If it is wished that the Constitution and the laws be truthful, it should not be consented that no one can infringe them; and the more elevated the category of the public officials, the more imperious the need of not permitting that it superimpose itself upon them.21
Emilio Rabasa, in front of the constitutionalization of the protection in judicial businesses of 1917 and in front of the generational education of lawyers who perceived the protection of judicial businesses as a normal resource, ranked it as a necessary evil whose fatal consequences concerning federal justice had to be attenuated. Because of this, he proposed in 1921 that the protection of judicial businesses be transformed in one cassation resource, differentiated from the Supreme Court.
If the protection originates by inexact application from the civil or penal law and if Mexico possesses a virtual legislation unified by both matters, promoted by the respective codes, the cassation through a central court would not offend the federal system and would be the solution for the remainder and the loss of prestige of the Supreme Court and of the judgment of protection that have been forced in order to revise the local judgments and make uniform the jurisprudence concerning a matter that aspires to be unique and national.22
Notes
* Translated by Diana Hernández Holtzman.
** Researcher at the Legal Research Institute.
1 The constitutional law of August 18, 1824 of Tamaulipas determined: "1. Nobody, even if he is a magistrate, a judge or a lawyer, can interpret the laws; if this were not so, these would be understood for their literal tenor, giving to the common voices the significance that they generally have in the State, and in the Nation; and to the techniques (or of some art, vocation or faculty) significance with which the respective professors understand. 2. The Tribunal that doubts of the meaning of a law will consult it with the Legislative Body, and if he were an inferior judge he would do it by means of the Tribunal of Justice. 3. The person who interprets a law will be punished if he is an authority as an arbitrary attacker against the rights of the citizens; and if he is a lawyer he will remain deprived of practicing in the State, if he is an individual, it will be applied by the Judge before whom the business is carried out or causes a fine, according to the powers of the individual and having considered his mental abilities This fine will never go under twenty five pesos, nor would it exceed two-hundred; and the Judge who imposes it will then make the Tribunal aware of third instance, in order that he approve it, moderate it, aggravate it or revoke it". Colección de leyes y decretos del Congreso Constituyente del estado libre de las Tamaulipas, 1825, Ciudad Victoria, Imprenta del Estado, 1825, p. 7.
2 Other cases were polemically discussed in 1869 against the text of the recently promulgated Law of Protection. The protection promoted by General Canto, defendant of the homicide of General Patoni, against the sentence of the Superior Tribunal of Justice of Durango (cfr. El derecho, t. 11, on Saturday, May 8, 1869, num. 19, p. 340). On the other hand, the protection of Colonel Carlos Gagern against the sentence of privation of employment emitted by the Juror of Sentence or the Council of War of the Military Command of Mexico was rejected in accordance to the law of protection of making the protection against judicial business according to law, which in this case was federal (cfr. El derecho, t. 11, on Saturday, April 3, 1869, num. 14, pp. 246 and 247 and on Saturday, June 12, 1865, num. 24, p. 426).
3 Barragán Barragán, José, Proceso de discusión de la Ley de Amparo de 1869, 2nd ed., Mexico, UNAM, 1987, p. 97.
4 Ibidem, p. 258. Session of January 9, 1869.
5 Ibidem, pp. 247 and 248. Session of January 4, 1869.
6 Session of November 27, 1868.
7 According to Deputy Ríos y Valles, the problems of constitutionality arisen in local judicial business should also be solved by the same tribunals. Session of December 28, 1868. The second part of the above cited order refers, after declaring to the federal Constitution as supreme law of the whole Union, that "The judges of every State will establish themselves according to the above mentioned Constitution, laws and agreements, in spite of the dispositions in on the contrary that can exist in the constitutions or laws of the States".
8 For Deputy Lama the fact that protection in judicial business had not been discussed in the Constitution of 1857, it did not invalidate the legislator in order that it legislate regarding the matter. Interpreting grammatically the relative constitutional disposition. Barragán, op. cit., pp. 227 and 228. Session of January 2, 1869.
9 Beveridge, Albert J., The Life of John Marshall, 2nd ed., Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1947, 4 vol., p. 160.
10 In this sense it is understood that the Constitution and federal law is the supreme law of the whole Union. Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 2nd ed., Mineola, The Foundation Press, Inc., 1973, p. 11.
11 Beveridge, op. cit., pp. 158 and 159. A second case confirmed this precedent. Cohen v. Com. of Virginia 19. v. s. 264 (1821). Warren, Charles, The Supreme Court in United States History, vol. I, 1789-1835, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1922, pp. 442 and 453.
12 Informe del gobernador Domingo Rubí, Culiacán, 1869, Biblioteca Nacional FR. 354.72008 Mex. n. 48.
13 Nakayama A., Antonio, Sinaloa. Un bosquejo de su historia, Universidad Autónoma de Sinaloa, p. 310.
14 Informe de gobierno de Domingo Rubí rendido en Mazatlán el 15 de octubre de 1869, Fondo Lafragua. R. 949 LAF p. 8.
15 Buelna, Eustaquio, Compendio histórico, geográfico y estadístico del estado de Sinaloa, Mexico, Press and lithography of Irineo Paz, 1877, p. 62.
16 Cabrera Acevedo, Lucio, La Suprema Corte de Justicia. La República y el Imperio, Suprema Corte de Justicia, pp. 204 and 205.
17 Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo de la Suprema Corte de Justicia, box 81, proceeding 45.
18 The decision of the Supreme Court which was published does not declare article 8 of the Law of Protection unconstitutional and its arguments are not diffused describing only in a schematic manner, reasons of legal kind but not constitutional.
19 Still in 1874 the public prosecutor Ignacio Manuel Altamirano would ease points concerning the case Vega and the fulfillment of the sentence of protection.
20 Since the project of reforms to the Law of Protection of October 1877, Secretary of Justice, Protasio Tagle, accepts as "admitted the principle that protection originates in judicial businesses..." for this he introduces, in article 31 of the initiative, cassation. La Suprema Corte de Justicia a principios del Porfirismo (1877-1882), Suprema Corte de Justicia, 1990, pp. 456 and 457.
21 Tovar, Pantaleón, Historia parlamentaria del Cuarto Congreso Constitucional, México, Imprenta Cumplido, t. 4, 1874, pp. 290 and 291.
22 Rabasa, Emilio, "Reformas a la Constitución Política de la República con el fin de organizar la Corte Suprema de Justicia, como un Tribunal que pueda garantizar la rapidez de sus resoluciones y cumplir las funciones técnicas que la Constitución le encomienda", Memoria del Primer Congreso Jurídico Nacional, México, Imprenta M. León Sánchez, 1922, pp. 19-28.
