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NUMBER 1   JANUARY - JUNE 2004

    THE ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL REFORM: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY PROPOSAL FOR STUDYING MEXICAN STATE COURTS*
    José Antonio CABALLERO JUÁREZ
    Hugo A. CONCHA CANTÚ**

    Original Text (Spanish) PDF

    SUMMARY
    I. Introduction. II. Theoretic Model. III. Application of the model: evaluating judicial reforms in Mexican state courts.


    I. INTRODUCTION

    It is problematic to carry out an empirical analysis of the concept of judicial reform. Despite its apparently simple conceptual unity, it implies a substantial number of considerations at an institutional level. An institution is a set of formal and informal rules that share a common purpose and the same goal.1 Thus, an institution implies not only material and cultural aspects, or in other words, organizational and structural issues, but also traditions, customs and personal beliefs, which ultimately characterize the institution as a congruent whole.

    The term "judicial reform" refers to those processes aimed at modernizing or transforming legal institutions, and it necessarily implies changes in the material or cultural aspects of these. That is why the term "judicial reform" usually alludes to any of the following activities: the first includes the processes that will lead to the eventual transformation of structures within the courts (the number of judges, location, management, budget); a second one focuses on the different courses of action that these institutions may take to carry out their duties (handling cases, court administration, training); a third one refers to modifications made to rules of procedure. Yet another aspect can be discussed, which is almost never taken into consideration, one that refers to the specific way officers of the court understand their roles and carry out their responsibilities.

    In order to be able to analyze a process of judicial reform, it is necessary to distinguish between the goals that are to be attained (efficiency, independence and accessibility) and the variables (of a structural, operative, procedural and subjective order) involved in reaching said goals. In other words, the complexity of the concept requires a clear distinction between the institution’s goals or objectives and the empirical variables that play a part in making each of these materialize. Thus, the concept of "judicial reform" may be effective and meaningful in an empirical analysis, as long as it is used along with a theoretical or methodological model that includes not only the goals being sought, but also the variables that form part of them. While the former includes some theoretical elements normally used in deductive analysis, the latter focuses on empirical factors that form part of an inductive analysis. As a result, the ideal tool for studying an institutional process of change –such as judicial reform– is a model of mixed analysis, that is both inductive and deductive.

    The instruments designed to measure a process of judicial reform (its evolution and its impact) must consider this combined method of analysis. Once the empirical elements have been gathered and suitably linked to the goals and objectives which supposedly should be reached, it is possible to have a clearer idea of the entire process. This means that analytical instruments would be used in two stages. The first would be aimed at isolating empirical data which is possible to find in multiple aspects of a given institution (for example, its structural characteristics). The second stage would consist of joining together all these elements and fragmented data to coherently form a larger theoretical concept (for example, the concept of efficiency).

    However, numerous questions arise from this type of method when attempting to understand the scope and boundaries of comparing different legal institutions. What is the proper way to compare different institutions? Which institutions can be compared if they display different characteristics? What should be done if a comparison must be made between certain institutions that are carrying out judicial reform processes and others that are not? What are the variables that characterize any legal institution? Is there an established list of elements? How can one compare the institutional effects of judicial reform?

    These questions are important if we want to compare these institutions, considering that court systems are different. In many cases, the differences are significant enough to put any attempt to compare two or more legal institutions at risk. The wide variety of institutional arrangements that form part of a court system can produce different results in the way the court system is run. One clear example is that an urban legal institution has problems that are very different from a rural one. Therefore, it is necessary to consider these variables to be able to carry out an appropriate comparative study.

    This piece posits the possibility of developing a useful method of comparison to measure how the judicial reform process is working in different court systems. The theoretical model is based on three principles that govern legal activity in a western democracy (independence, efficiency and accessibility) and a large number of variables (of a structural, procedural, operative and subjective order) that have been empirically observed to constitute said principles. Based on the experience of analyzing judicial reform in the 32 Mexican state courts, we will try to present a combined method to compare legal institutions.

    II. THEORETICAL MODEL

    The proposed model is aimed at carrying out an institutional analysis and is based on what we have identified as the three most important principles that guide judicial activities. These are efficiency, independence and accessibility. To study how these principles work within a legal institution, we have developed four analytical fields, which are structure and organization, procedures (jurisdictional activity), administration and operation and subjective elements (individual dynamics). Each of these elements will provide us with evidence of how each principle is being attained. All four contain multiple components that describe specific characteristics of a legal institution.

    The following chart gives an example of how the principles and analytical fields are linked by the existence of specific variables.

    METHODOLOGICAL SCHEME TO ANALYZE PRINCIPLES AND VARIABLES

     

    Efficiency

    Independence

    Accessibility

     

    Appointments

    Appointments

    Geographic distribution

     

    Structure

    Number of personnel

    Budget

    Installed capacity

    and

    Organization

    Budget

    Self- government

    Regional courts of appeal

     

    Administrative controls

    Disciplinary controls

    Small-claims courts

     

    Suitable legislation

    Judge’s control over the process

     

    Dissemination and clarity of laws

     

    Backlog of case files

    Control of responsibilities

     

    Due process

     

    Due process

    Handling of the workload

     

    Terms

     

    Procedures

    (Jurisdictional

    Workload

    Obstacles to the proceedings

    Alternative mechanisms for ruling on conflicts (MARC)

    Activity)

    Time frames

    Backlog of case files

    Costs

     

    Productivity controls

     

    Legal counseling

     

    Alternative means of conflict resolution (MARC)

     

     

     

    Costs

     

     

     

    Infrastructure

    Career in civil service

    Infrastructure

     

    Administration

    Equipment

    Salaries

    Handling of information and statistics

    And

    Operation

    Civil Service

    Length of time in the position

    Legal counseling

     

    Training

    Retirement

     

     

    Personnel

    Training

     

     

    Handling of information and statistics

    Handling of information and statistics

     

     

    Administrative and procedural controls

     

     

     

    Subjective

    Seniority and level of education

    Seniority and level of education

    Trust

    Elements (individual

    Origin and experience

    Origin and experience

     

    Dynamics)

    Ideology,

    attitudes

    Ideology,

    attitudes

     

    The principles are found in the upper row of the chart (efficiency, independence and accessibility). These are concepts that refer to ideal goals for the institution, but, which in themselves, are empty of content. That is, we know that the court system in a western democratic State should be efficient, independent and accessible, but we do not know what any of these concepts truly means since they can refer to a variety of things. Therefore, the concepts must be developed in connection with empirical data.

    Given the three principles that guide court systems in western democracies, we hold that any judicial reform process seeks to comply with at least one of these principles and most of these processes aim at fulfilling all of them. It is important to mention that some measures can promote two or more principles, even though some can benefit one, but harm the others.

    The principle of efficiency ensures the way in which judges carry out their duties. These officials are obligated to fulfill their duties within the time limits and according to the conditions established by law.2 Only if justice is carried out in accordance with the exigencies of promptness and in compliance with the conditions of due process, can it be said that a fair trial has been carried out.3

    Independence establishes a necessary boundary between legal activity and any other governmental activity or political figure to create the conditions that make this activity impartial or neutral.4 Externally, judicial independence means that the Judicial Branch is not subordinate to any other branch or social force, or that there are enough barriers to protect the Judicial Branch from any interference so that it may remain neutral. Internally, independence means that judges are autonomous. Any judge, regardless of his position within the legal institution, must be protected from any external interference and must be granted a degree of independence, which guarantees suitable working conditions.

    The objectives of the principle of access to justice refer to the way in which legal institutions are kept accessible to the entire society, instead of only being there for certain privileged groups.5

    The rows in the chart essentially represent the analytical fields that the empirical information will contain. In other words, we classified real characteristics of existing institutions in accordance with these four analytical fields. Once we have this empirical information, we can use it to give specific meaning to the abovementioned principles. According to the example given in the chart, this means that efficiency will refer to the existence of certain structural variables such as the procedures for appointments, a certain number of personnel and a specific budget, as well as the existence of certain administrative controls.

    It is very important to point out that the crucial aspect of this framework is its coherence. The empirical data used to fill in each category and each principle do not matter, but they must be the same if we are trying to compare different institutions.

    The problem in comparative exercises is that there are no parameters to determine the proper time to use them. Comparisons should be made on the same level of analysis in terms of the content of these levels, as Sartori6 argued many years ago. It is not a matter of simply confronting concepts or data, but of making these comparisons with epistemological congruity. The concepts should be compared to other concepts and data should be compared to equivalent data. If the concepts that characterize legal institutions –mainly efficiency, independence and accessibility– are complex due to the array of possible variables that explain and construct them, then the same rule of comparison should be applied to them.

    Theoretical tools, such as those proposed herein for studying judicial reform, which use data to characterize concepts, can only be compared to other similar frameworks. For example, if the concept of efficiency of a legal institution is understood as the specific characterization of 3 variables –budget allocation, the time of deliberation and the number of cases– then the efficiency of another institution can only be analyzed and compared by using the same content. If this is not done, then we end up comparing things that are apparently similar, but that are in reality describing different phenomena. The efficiency of a legal institution simply refers to an issue that is completely different from the efficiency analyzed in another. The conclusion is that each of the three concepts used to describe legal institutions should combine the same number and type of variables if they are to be compared with concepts from other legal institutions.

    As to the first category, structure and organization, it is designed to provide several considerations regarding the size of the state courts, their geographic distribution and their capacity. Furthermore, it contains an analysis of the different levels that form part of the Judicial Branch of each state. The government agencies that oversee the court system may be examined from three perspectives: their individual attributes, the way they interact and the relationship with each court in the system. This analysis may also consider the relationship between the Judicial Branch and other branches, and the way the budget of the court system is determined.

    The category of procedures (jurisdictional activity) is meant to examine all the variables related with any jurisdictional activity in the courts. It may include an analysis of the existing legal framework and the way the Judicial Branch conceives of and applies it in its interpretations. Some specific types may include distinctive elements of performance in civil or criminal matters. It is also important to incorporate the way judges see their role in the many aspects of their performance.

    The category of administration and operation begins by presenting a description of the facilities and equipment in courts. It tries to give an image of the places where jurisdictional activities are carried out, considering the buildings as places not only for judges, but also for the people who look for solutions to their conflicts. In this category, the civil service career and all its aspects can be important, just as much as issues about salaries, training, stability and discipline. This category should consider aspects of control of handling case files and the administration of the Judicial Branch. Moreover, it is important to examine how personnel carry out their every day tasks, including the way human resources are organized and whether there are any guidelines for court activities. Finally, this category could yield some considerations as to how the courts produce information about their own activities, how they present it and how they use it.

    The category of subjective elements (individual dynamics) can give us an extensive profile of the people that work as judges, by analyzing their seniority in the institution and their level of education, their experience in very delicate tasks and the way they became members of the court system. Finally, it is important to know something about their attitudes and their ideology, as factors that could determine a specific direction and style of working.

    III. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL: EVALUATING JUDICIAL REFORMS IN MEXICAN STATE COURTS

    Since 1994, all the Mexican state courts (32) have experienced a series of transformations.7 These transformations have affected such a wide gamut of structural and operational aspects that it has become very difficult to understand the specific state of affairs of each court and even more so to develop the perspective needed to compare the process nationwide.

    Mexican state courts display a wide variety of structures, as well as procedures for carrying out their routine tasks. The judicial reform process was also experienced by state courts in significantly different ways. Due to the diverse information obtained from each of the processes, an attempt to analyze them from a comparative point of view also implies numerous problems. In fact, an attempt to compare this information would probably generate more confusion, instead of clarifying something for us about the organization and the workings of the courts. A comparative exercise designed to grade and classify state courts is even more difficult. How can we compare a state Judicial Branch that has a limited budget and carries out its activities primarily in a rural environment with one that has sufficient budget and that mainly serves an urban population? The problem is even more complex since this situation can even occur within a same Judicial Branch. How can a court of competent jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters in an indigenous region be compared with a court specializing in business-law matters located in the state capital? If the question focuses on equipment, we would have a similar problem since it is difficult to compare a court that works with almost no equipment with another that is equipped with modern technology.

    In order to answer these questions, it is not enough to recognize just how different the circumstances are in which these courts function, and the differences in equipment, since such an exercise could only lead us to realize that a comparison is practically impossible. Comparing the court systems of different states or countries or courts within the same system can only be done by focusing on elements that are common to any court in a western democracy. These elements include, among others, a hierarchical organization, procedures that uphold the rights of due process and an administrative system that is independent from the adjudicative role, as well as the same authority and jurisdiction. What we want to stress is that while one statement says that court X is better than court Y, it may not say much about these two institutions; an analysis of the way they manage their resources or how they use their equipment could provide a better description of how these organizations work.

    The following are some conclusions obtained after having compared Mexican state courts by using the abovementioned method. We compared what we considered the main topics of four different analytical categories, in which we classified any legal institution. These were: their structure, their jurisdictional activities, their administration and the subjective dynamics of the individuals that work in the courts. With these comparisons, we can identify the tendencies that state courts follow from a national perspective, which will eventually give us a general perspective of justice in the country from an institutional point of view. Of course, this is only an initial examination of the Mexican state courts. We are aware of the need for more studies to reach better-grounded conclusions.

    It is important to stress that the principles shown in the columns of the chart are rarely made up of isolated elements. Many of these variables, which characterize the different aspects of these institutions, can be seen as components of other principles. For example, a suitable mechanism for appointing judges will be relevant to efficiency and independence. It is relevant to independence since it is commonplace to see how other branches participate in the selection process. But it can also be relevant to the principle of efficiency since the selection process entails a search for capable judges. If we take into account that judges must also be upright, we should reason that the principle of accessibility is also involved. Another example can be seen by considering how courts are equipped. This issue is considered part of what we call administration and operation, and can be easily identified as an issue that is closely related to the principle of efficiency. This fact simply demonstrates that the principles that form the ideal model of a legal institution interact with each other. If a court is independent, it is quite likely that it is also, up to a certain point, efficient and accessible.

    Using this method, we proceeded to gather information from all state courts and to classify it within each of our four main categories, taking into account its relation to the three main principles.

    1. Efficiency

    As previously mentioned, efficiency in the court system can be considered a search to obtain the best performance at the lowest possible cost. A wide variety of measures designed to strike the difficult balance between performance and cost fall under this principle.8 Generally, there is constant tension between these two goals; it is very likely that a measure that helps improve performance will have a negative impact on costs and vice versa.

    In the course of the judicial reform process in Mexican state courts that began in the last decade, issues related to efficiency were what most attracted the attention of officers of the court. Among these, efforts are mostly concentrated on reducing the time it takes to decide a matter. Almost any discussion concerning the court system refers to what has been accomplished or what needs to be done to reduce the time needed to end a trial. Therefore, the matter of backlogs of case files is closely tied to this question.

    It is important to note that the efforts made to lower costs have been limited because of the poor conditions under which the courts have traditionally operated. Some strategies developed to improve the efficiency of the latter have been:

    • Mechanisms for appointments that produce more capable judges.

    • Increase in staff.

    • Increased budget.

    • Setting up and improving administrative controls for resource management.

    • Legislative reforms to simplify legal procedures.

    • Significant public efforts made to reduce legal backlog.

    • Review of due legal process (emphasizing the compliance with terms).

    • Better distribution and handling of case files.

    • Setting up and improving productivity controls.

    • Use of alternative mechanisms for conflict resolution (MARC for its initials in Spanish) to lessen the workload.

    • Remodeling and, in many cases, enlarging facilities.

    • Implementing improvements to the equipment.

    • Development of a career in civil service.

    • Establishing on-going training programs.

    • Establishing human resources policies (selection, hiring and training).

    • Setting up information and statistics systems.

    • Redesigning internal work procedures.

    • Greater attention to the necessary profile for judges.

    It is worth pointing out that there is almost no information that measures the impact of the reforms. Therefore, it is very difficult to establish what the true result of the reform process has been. Some officers of the court believe that the reforms have not had the desired effects and some even think that the reforms have had a negative impact on the courts.

    However, the reform has had some effects that are evident. State court sources are constantly pointing out how they have improved in many areas. In fact, these reforms are receiving so much attention that we are led to believe that state courts decided to make quantity a priority over quality in their reform agendas. In view of this phenomenon, we could argue that the quality of the rulings is an issue that still needs to be resolved. Efforts to improve court rulings have been limited and the tools used to verify quality are very simple ones. Most only focus on the outcome of the ruling when one of the parties files for an appeal. Therefore, a judge is thought to be doing a good job if most of his rulings are confirmed by a higher court. A more complex system to measure the quality of rulings would have to use more sophisticated tools.

    On the other hand, most of the efforts directed toward improving court efficiency have been developed in quite a simplistic way. Possibly, the most representative example is that of revising laws. There have been practically no projects that include the use of diverse variables to focus on problems of efficiency in the court system, which shows a complete lack of strategic legal planning.

    As pointed out above, Mexican state courts usually use very simple tools to measure and assess the result of their projects or even their daily tasks. The courts still use evaluation systems that were created at least fifty years ago and, in many cases, the information these sources provide has very limited use. Some court systems have modified these tools to adapt them to their current needs. Most of these adjustments are closely related to implementing tools developed to control the productivity of each judge. Nonetheless, performance assessment is an issue that is still pending in Mexican state courts.

    2. Independence

    Behind the principle of independence lies the need to guarantee that courts are impartial. This not only benefits common citizens by protecting them from any kind of arbitrary conduct, but it also ensures that the institution legitimated to interpret the law may do so without any external influences.

    Even though efficiency has held most of the attention of officers of the court in the reform process, independence has not been set aside. In fact, in many cases, it is possible to identify the measures taken to strengthen the independence of the Judicial Branch, which also has a favorable impact on efficiency. An example of this could be the increase in the Judicial Branch’s budget and the implementation of methods that lower the number of discretionary decisions in the process.

    Independence must be understood from two angles. On one hand, we include the protection of the court system from intervention from public or private agents. We can identify this as independence from an external point of view. On the other hand, we look into the court system itself to determine whether the judges can remain uninfluenced by their superiors when they make a decision in a proceeding. This is internal independence.

    The state of affairs in Mexican state courts reveals that external independence has improved in many ways, though there is still much to be done regarding internal independence. Many local judicial branches still retain a hierarchical structure that is too vertical and often interferes with judges’ autonomy. In some cases, the implementation of new methods designed to improve administrative, productivity and disciplinary controls can have a negative impact on internal independence.9

    Internal independence can also be affected when the criteria for assigning equipment or human resources are not clearly identified. A lack of such criteria makes the allocation process discretionary, which can create incentives for discrimination against judges. For example, in a given state court, one judge can have five computers while the judge down the hall may not even have one.

    From an institutional perspective, it is important to point out how the transformation of the court system has come about. In many states, judicial reform began outside the Judicial Branch. In fact, in the mid-nineties, when reform processes were beginning, governors presented several initiatives to modify the laws that govern the court system.10 Sometimes, even the planning and design of initiatives that were to transform the laws of the court system were made without the assistance of any member of the Judicial Branch. It is somewhat ironic that the Executive Branch was responsible for strengthening judicial independence, since state governors have traditionally represented a major obstacle to obtaining judicial independence.

    As of the moment, it is still very difficult to come to a general conclusion about independence in Mexican state courts. There are at least twelve states in which the construction of judicial independence is still in an early stage. However, it is important to point out that all court systems are currently in the process of strengthening their independence. Some of the main strategies to attain this principle are the following:

    • Implementing procedures for appointments that produce more independent judges.

    • Budget increases negotiated through more autonomous methods.

    • Setting up mechanisms of self-government to separate administrative work from legal work.

    • Establishing and improving disciplinary controls.

    • Establishing transparent procedures and mechanisms of liability for the obligations derived from said procedures.

    • Establishing systems to handle the workload.

    • Active participation with Congress to create laws that affect the court system.

    • Establishing the legal career.

    • Improving salary conditions.

    • Establishing judicial immovability.

    • Public relations and information campaigns.

    • Rules that guarantee job stability.

    • Training and ongoing education programs.

    • Better retirement conditions.

    • Better working conditions to promote self-esteem.

    It is necessary to realize that, although court systems have taken serious measures to guarantee independence from external agents, there is still much to do in terms of internal independence. Building genuine impartiality requires judges that are immune to any type of pressure.

    Another important issue regarding judicial independence has to do with its consequences. Court systems have to be able to produce impartial, well written rulings within a short period of time. For this to happen, it is also necessary to strengthen the court system’s rendering of accounts. Judges must answer for their performance at work and therefore it is necessary to develop suitable procedures to determine whether there are administrative, disciplinary or criminal liabilities. Also needed is a system that lends transparency to the way in which the budget is assigned.

    As mentioned previously, a policy aimed at helping the court system to communicate with society could be useful in building the independence of the institution. Mexican state courts have taken some steps to establish a permanent communication policy. However, most efforts have focused on strengthening the image of the court system, leaving many other areas unattended. For example, efforts to provide information on the results of certain proceedings are still scarce. There is still much to be done in this area.

    3. Accessibility

    The principle of accessibility receives the least amount of attention in the judicial reform processes in Mexican state courts. This can be explained by considering that the guidelines for judicial reform were focused mainly on solving the problems that were most visible to society and those that produced results in a short amount of time. Since access to justice requires more profound modifications, and even the transformation of the way society understands justice, the process to attain it is neither short nor easy to carry out and implies a gigantic transformation of the legal culture.

    If we believe that the justice system is a "system by which people can assert their rights and/or solve their conflicts under the general auspices of the State", then the principle of accessibility should ensure that the system is equally accessible to any individual in society and that its results are "individually and socially fair".11 A justice system that keeps itself at a distance from society because of its technical complexity, high costs and other obstacles, tends to turn the State into an arbitrary and authoritarian society. Justice is more than solving private conflicts; it is a useful means for connecting the State with society.

    Mexico has undertaken several efforts aimed at making access to justice easier, but most of them have been insufficient or have failed. The best example is the right to free access to justice, as established in the Constitution. This right has proved to be insufficient since real social conditions make access to justice, through professional intermediaries, an activity that is too expensive.

    There are many other obstacles that hinder access, such as geographic coverage, language, culture and, above all, economic inequality. Nowadays, many social groups avoid the justice system despite having conflicts that need to be resolved. The upper classes can look for alternative ways to solve their conflicts which require less time and money, but the lower classes avoid the justice system simply because they do not know how it works or because they are not given adequate counsel. This prompts the lower classes to look for alternatives that result in fewer problems.

    In order to improve access to justice, activities in Mexican state courts include:

    • Improving the geographic distribution of the courts.

    • Increasing the capacity to meet the existing demand for justice and to offer wider coverage.

    • Improving small-claims court systems.

    • Communication programs aimed at informing people about the role of the court system.

    • Compliance with the due process, especially in that which refers to terms.

    • Promotion by the courts of alternative means to solve controversies.

    • Improving court management so as to make procedures easier and faster.

    • Programs designed to facilitate access to indigenous communities.

    • Improving public defense and legal counseling services.

    • Implementing State-sponsored legal counseling services.

    • Better public facilities.

    • Numerous conditions that build people’s trust in the courts.

    The set of tools proposed herein to carry out a comparative analysis of legal institutions could be very useful in assessing judicial reform processes. However, it is limited. It does not attempt to be an extensive mechanism to analyze all aspects of the courts in a society. It simply attempts to provide analytical resources from an institutional perspective. The main purpose of this piece then is to propose a set of theoretical tools that can be used in different scenarios, having proven its usefulness in the case of Mexican state courts.

    Notes
    * This paper was presented at the 2001 Law and Society Association and the Research Committee on Sociology of Law at the Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, on July 4 to 7.
    ** Researchers at the UNAM Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas [Juridical Research Institute].
    1 It is apparent that this is a simplistic version of the definition set forth by D. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
    2 Hector Fix Fierro, La eficiencia de la justicia. Una aproximacion y una propuesta Mexico: UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas, 1995, and Santos Pastor, ¡Ah de la justicia!: política judicial y economia Spain:, Centro de Publicaciones del Ministerio de Justicia [The Center of Publications of the Ministry of Justice], Civitas.
    3 Miguel Sarre, and Fernando Figueroa, "Perspectives on the Right to a Fair Trial in Mexico", The Right to a Fair Trial, and Adrian Zuckerman, "Justice in Crisis: Comparative Dimensions of Civil Procedure", Civil Justice in Crisis, Oxford University Press, 1999.
    4 Jose Ramon Cossio Diaz, Jurisdiccion federal y carrera judicial en México, Mexico: UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 1996.
    5 Santos Pastor, op. cit., footnote 2.
    6 See the famous article by Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics", The American Political Science Review LXIV, no. 4, 1970 : 1033-1053.
    7 This can be seen in Hugo A. Concha Cantu, and Jose Antonio Caballero Juarez, La reforma judicial en las entidades federativas (presented at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association in Miami), published in Jose Maria Serna de la Garza, and Jose Antonio Caballero Juarez, Estado de derecho y transicion juridica, Mexico: UNAM Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas, 2002, 235-290. Also see by the first two authors, Diagnostico sobre la administracion de justicia en las entidades federativas: un estudio institucional sobre la justicia local en Mexico, Mexico: UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas, 2001.
    8 Hector Fix Fierro, op. cit., footnote 2
    9 This situation is clearly exemplifies how it is possible to promote one principle (efficiency) while harming another (independence).
    10 This is also true for the federal court system, since the reform process began in 1994 when President Zedillo sent a bill to Congress to transform the Judicial Branch.
    11 Mauro Cappelletti, and Brian Garth, "General Report", in Mauro Cappelletti, and Brian Garth, eds., Access to Justice, A World Survey, I, Book I, Milan: Dott. A. Guiffre Editore, 1978, 6.

 Copyright 2012 Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, UNAM